http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2006/10/are-mormons-trinitarian/
http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2005/10/thinking-about-the-trinity/
http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2007/07/guest-post-the-apostles-creed-and-the-book-of-mormon/
http://blog.beliefnet.com/crunchycon/2007/05/mormons-christians-or-not.html
http://blog.beliefnet.com/crunchycon/2007/12/on-mormonism.html

Since we have transferred the discussion to e-mail I will send my response that way.

I mean I have no intuition of this, so I can’t relate to it. I still can’t. Putting the two concepts together — to be frank — seems like a contradiction to me. It’s like saying “a perfectly round square.” I know what a square is and I know what round is, but putting them together does nothing but create confusion.

BUT please note that none of this matters. I’m explaining my point of view, but it’s irrelvant to understanding the orthodox Trinity because, I can see, that this is a postulate. I will accept the postulate.

“All I can say is…”

This is no longer relevant now that I’ve taken the postulate that God is immaterial and that you do not define immaterial in an way I am familiar with. In fact, now that it’s a postulate I believe that means it doesn’t need to be defined at all.

“I suggest bearing in mind the difference between conceiving and imagining…”

EXCELLENT POINT! But no, it is not what I mean in this case when I speak of not understanding what an immaterial God is. I literally lack a definition for immaterial that fits anything you are saying about God. But your point is very very valid to the discussion in general.

“To conceive of an immaterial being all you have to do is combine the concept of immateriality with the concept of being, and you’re there”

As previously stated, I believe this is incorrect. I believe there is no way to conceive an immaterial God but by postulate unless you meant God is formless, which is not what I think you meant based on context.

Consider the two definitions in my handy dictionary:

1. Having no material body or form.
2. Of no importance or relevance.

Now I’m going to assume we didn’t mean #2.

But what does it mean to not have a material body or form?

Is gas immaterial? Yes, from a certain point of view. From another point of view even gas has form. If you told me God is immaterial in the same sense gas is immaterial, I’d understand what you meant. But is that what you meant?

Is energy immaterial? Yes, from a certain point of view. Of course we all know that energy and matter are really the same substance (E=MC2) but I think we can say energy has no form or body. Then again, is that really true? Does energy truly have no form at all in any sense of the word “form”? I guess I’m not so sure. But regardless, is this what you really meant? If you was, then I could understand what an immaterial God is. (I’d think of you as believing God is energy.)

Another way something might be immaterial would be if it’s conceptual only, like say math. Is this what you meant by immaterial? Are you saying God is just a concept?

Something could be immaterial by not existing. I doubt this is what you meant.

I’m not being difficult here, I literally can’t think of any way to conceive of God being immaterial except in some way like the above, none of which I believe either of us except as true about God. I can’t think of any definition of immaterial that fits with God without either saying something that I doubt you meant or being a contradiction.

You write, “I don’t want you to feel defensive on this.”

No worries there, my friend. : )

You write, “I was fairly specific when I stated that I didn’t want you to use those example, not because I am denying God is immaterial but because those examples don’t help my comprehension because I share no concept with you of an immaterial God.”

I don’t understand what you mean by saying we “share no concept” of an immaterial God. You understand the word “immaterial”, do you not? I know you understand the concept of a god. So all you have to do is put those two concepts together, and we will be sharing the concept.

I think you really mean that we share no *belief* in an immaterial God. Certainly that’s true. But not believing in something need not prevent us from being able to conceive of it, and to share an understanding of the concept. I don’t believe in unicorns but it takes me little effort to combine the concepts of “horse” and “horn” to form the concept “unicorn”, and to share that concept with another person.

You write, “Are there any examples of non-physical substance other than God or Spirits?”

No, none that I can think of.

You write, “Aristotle’ used only physical examples. I grasp no meaning (even if the failure is my own due to lack of vocabulary) other than physical in his statement. What I mean to say is: I understand his statement as it applies to the physical world, but not as it applies to a non-physical world.”

All I can say is, I don’t know why you don’t understand it as it applies to a non-physical being. I gave the example of omnipotence being predicable of God: God is a thing in which omnipotence inheres. Omnipotence does not exist on its own, it can only exist as a predicate of something: When a thing is omnipotent, then omnipotence exists; when no thing is omnipotent, then omnipotence does not exist. I assume you have no problem conceiving of a material being in whom omnipotence inheres. That material being would be the substance in which omnipotence inheres, or in other words the subject of which omnipotence is predicated. All you have to do is change “material” to “immaterial”, and you’ve got it.

I suggest bearing in mind the difference between conceiving and imagining. I have no doubt that it’s difficult for you to imagine an immaterial being; it’s only natural since our nature limits our imaginations such that they can only present images to our minds which are composed of fragments and combinations of physical perceptions. Our imaginations have no “material” with which to construct an image of an immaterial being, except by representing it as a glowing transparent sphere or an all-permeating mist, or some such; which, if immaterial beings really exist, must be inaccurate.

But there is no logical ground upon which to hold that imaginability is a prerequisite to conceivability or believability. To conceive of an immaterial being all you have to do is combine the concept of immateriality with the concept of being, and you’re there.

By the way if you would like to convert this discussion into a private one via e-mail I would be agreeable. I’m not sure how long we should continue to use this space to work out our differences of opinion. Feel free to e-mail me at agellius1 at gmail dot com. Or we can keep going here if you prefer.

What I should have said is that it has no meaning to me outside of physical and he didn’t give any other examples to help me bridge the gap. I wasn’t trying to make an absolute statement of fact, but rather an absolute statement of fact about my current understanding and the realistic possibility I could have understood otherwise based on what’s been said so far.

That being said, we’re gonna spend a lot of time if you are going to require me every time to add a similar caveat. I hope you will see past my language and attempt to understand the underlying meaning.

2. Logic. a. to affirm or assert (something) of the subject of a proposition.

That’s what you mean? It’s not what I expected.

Logic is something I actually do know something about.

Wikipedia states:
Sometimes it is inconvenient or impossible to describe a set by listing all of its elements. Another useful way to define a set is by specifying a property that the elements of the set have in common. The notation P(x) is used to denote a sentence or statement P concerning the variable object x. The set defined by P(x) written {x | P(x)}, is just a collection of all the objects for which P is sensible and true.

For instance, {x | x is a positive integer less than 4} is the set {1,2,3}.

In formal semantics a predicate is an expression of the semantic type of sets. An equivalent formulation is that they are thought of as indicator functions of sets, i.e. functions from an entity to a truth value.

In first-order logic, a predicate can take the role as either a property or a relation between entities.

For example, the sentences “The car Jane is driving is blue”, “The sky is blue”, and “The cover of this book is blue” come from the template “is blue” by placing an appropriate noun/noun phrase in front of it. The phrase “is blue” is a predicate and it describes the property of being blue. Predicates are often given a name. For example any of “is_blue”, “Blue” or “B” can be used to represent the predicate “is blue” among others. If we adopt B as the name for the predicate “is_blue”, sentences that assert an object is blue can be represented as “B(x)”, where x represents an arbitrary object. B(x) reads as “x is blue”.

Let’s compare this to your example of “hardness is predicated of a diamond, therefore a diamond is a substance, but hardness is not.”

Please use the above explanation (or point me to another one that fits better) with your example above.

I see that hardness is a characteristic of diamonds already.

By the way, is this link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory) an accurate description of what you mean by “substance”?

I have a question for you — theorectical only. What if “God” was made up of pure thought. (i.e., for the sake of argument take this as a given. I’m not asking you to believe it. It’s just a hypothetical). Would that mean that the substance of God was thought?

At this point, I think I have at least one assumption worked out that must be taken as a given to understand the Catholic point of view. “There is a substance (i.e. something distinct from it’s properties) that is God that cannot be broken down into any more parts. Thus it’s not made up of anything and while it has properties (like omnipotence or perfect love) those are properties of ths substance of God. This is a postulate for Trinitarians.”

Feel free to help me reword that.

Okay, I am not trying to cause problems. I was fairly specific when I stated that I didn’t want you to use those example, not because I am denying God is immaterial but because those examples don’t help my comprehension because I share no concept with you of an immaterial God. You seem to have misunderstood what I said here.

Let me try this again in a different way: Are there any examples of non-physical substance other than God or Spirits? Can you please give me some if there are or just tell me that those are the two examples. This will help quite a bit. (I’m working on a theory of why your examples seem meaningless to me based on a difference in some assumptions that we do not share.)

“Aristotle’s definition does have meaning when applied to non-physical substances. Your failure to grasp its meaning when so applied does not prove there isn’t one.”

You are correct. It’s possible there is a meaning here I’m not grasping and thus the failure would be that I don’t yet have enough understanding of either the words or the assumptions he is hold. I don’t want you to feel defensive on this. All that being said, it was a valid thing to say in this discussion. It’s still valid. Aristotle’ used only physical examples. I grasp no meaning (even if the failure is my own due to lack of vocabulary) other than physical in his statement. What I mean to say is: I understand his statement as it applies to the physical world, but not as it applies to a non-physical world.

“Predicate” in the sense in which I am using it is “to assert or affirm something about the subject of a statement”.

You write, “But this is a very physical definition. In fact, it has no meaning outside physical.”

In my view you are simply mistaken. Aristotle’s definition does have meaning when applied to non-physical substances. Your failure to grasp its meaning when so applied does not prove there isn’t one.

You ask for an example of a non-physical substance other than God or spirits, but I don’t understand why I need to give such. God and spirits are the examples. You give no logical reason why the word “substance” may not by applied to them, you merely assert it.

Whether we agree that God is physical or we don’t, is immaterial. Even if we consider spirits as only theoretical beings, logically the word “substance” may still be applied to them. This discussion, as I see it, is not about proving anything concerning the existence or nature of actual beings, it’s about understanding a belief.

You write, “But you are, indeed, having difficulty explaining your beliefs in a way that someone outside your faith could understand.”

I would say rather that (insofar as I may truly be said to be having difficulty) I am having difficulty explaining my beliefs in a way that *you* can understand. But why you can’t understand it is another question. I see no particular reason to attribute the difficulty to myself or my beliefs.

The doctrine of the Trinity, admittedly, may be hard for a non-Catholic to believe. I admit also that it may be hard for anyone, Catholic or non-Catholic, to fully grasp in all its aspects such that all mystery is eliminated. But I don’t admit that the doctrine, when stated simply, as Newman did, is hard to understand. As Newman pointed out, “these words [are] simple and clear, [and] are embodied in simple, clear, brief, categorical propositions”.

I have no problem with you finding it unbelievable. I deny that it’s not understandable.

Will you accept the following as the definition of “predicate” in the way you are using it: “to found or derive (a statement, action, etc.);”

I want to be sure your using a “dictionary definition” here.

If you are, then a “substance” is anything which is derived. I could see how that could be non-physical.

However, becareful in accepting this definition, it opens a can of worms since in essence a substance is then only that which something else is derived from. It would be hard to think of anything that isn’t a “substance” of something else. So I feel like this can’t be what you meant.