The Book of Mormon’s Doctrine of Deity

Your main point is indisputably true, and your evidence for it is impressive. I still think theologies are useful in helping us to see the “data points,” but, as you say, trying to classify ancient scripture as “post-millennial dispensationist radical preterArianist” or whatnot is a mug’s game.

Yes, I agree Adam, that labels are useful even if they are (and this is the point) just approximations.

I believe ‘approximations of truth’ are indeed truth. They just aren’t every bit of the truth.

My personal beliefs (as you’ll see in follow on posts if there is interest) is that LDS scriptural doctrine of deity (I say “scriptural” because individual members may differ from their own scriptures to some degree — and that is often fine precisely because approximations of truth are still truth) is really simultaneously tri-theistic, modalistic, and trinitarian in about equal measures. God is all colors, says Mormon scripture.

Bruce N.,
Paul says that we see through a glass darkly. To my mind, that suggests that embracing some particular kind of theory wholeheartedly is necessary to do justice to that aspect of God, but it ignores the truth that there are other aspects of God. Conversely, trying to do justice to all of God’s aspects and explain how they fit together does an injustice to all of them. I’ve never seen an attempt to reconcile God’s justice and His mercy that adequately captures either one of those qualities, for instance.

And so, I think, while modalism isn’t technically true, it seems to me that only a full-throated modalism is the only way that mortal minds can begin to understand the transcendent unity of the Father, Son, and Spirit.

I know remarkably little about the physics of God.

Yes, I have a testimony that two distinct Personages, glorious beyond description, appeared to Joseph Smith, and truthfully identified Themselves as the Father and the Son. Yes, the scriptures, both ancient and modern, teach that the righteous will someday partake of Divinity. Yes, there is widespread consensus in the Church that that Person we call the Father evolved (oh, that word! ) from a man. Yes, we believe in the Incarnation of the Son. Yes, we believe in the perfect unity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in purpose and power.

Was God the Father the first Man? Dunno. Was he ever a sinful Man? Dunno. Is there more to God, physically, than the Man seen by the prophets? I’m inclined to think so, but have no real knowledge. Is there an infinite regress of Gods? Dunno. Sometimes it seems like the only people who are sure what Mormonism teaches about the physics of God are its enemies.

Set aside the physics. What matters to me is that I have felt the presence of God at crucial points in my life, and those are the sweetest experiences I have experienced in mortality. So whatever the physics of God may be, they are secondary to John’s metaphor: God is Love.

In other words, I’m not convinced that knowing God and knowing the physics of God are at all theh same thing.

“…while modalism isn’t technically true, it seems to me that only a full-throated modalism is the only way that mortal minds can begin to understand the transcendent unity of the Father, Son, and Spirit.”

Yes, I agree with this.

“In other words, I’m not convinced that knowing God and knowing the physics of God are at all theh same thing.”

I agree with this too, whole heartedly.

Which is why I’m going to do more posts on the not as useful but still interesting physics of God (speculative of course.)

Let me say first that I’m not arguing over the truth or falsehood of anything you write, but only to correct what I see as slight inaccuracies concerning trinitarian theology.

You write, “The popular Christian idea that God has no physical presence, because God is everywhere present fully, is thus eliminated as a possibility.”

First, I’m confused by your distinction between God having a physical presence and God being “everywhere present fully” — if he has no physical presence, in what sense do you say he is “fully present” everywhere?

For my part, I would not say that he has no physical presence because he’s present everywhere, but rather that he has no physical presence because he’s not a physical being. Like goodness, truth and beauty, he’s a thing that just is not made of matter.

The sense in which he is present everywhere, though not physically, is that he is present wherever he acts. Since he constantly holds all matter in existence, he is present wherever there is matter. In that sense you might say that he is “physically present”, since he is present in matter, being its cause; but he is not “physically present” in the sense that he is not made of matter.

You write, “My personal beliefs … is really simultaneously tri-theistic, modalistic, and trinitarian in about equal measures.”

Since the word “Trinity” refers to the doctrine that God is simultaneously three in identity and one in substance, I don’t understand how you can call the LDS doctrine “trinitarian”. Certainly you can say that there are similarities, since the LDS doctrine contains three persons and a single Godhead. But to call that doctrine “trinitarian”, in my view is to co-opt the word to represent an essentially different concept, since it is of the essence of the definition of “Trinity” that the three Persons comprise a single substance. It would be like using the word “quadruped” to refer to two two-legged animals rather than a single four-legged one: Yes, four legs are involved, but by definition the word refers to one animal, not two.

Again I don’t mean to be contentious, I just like to define and distinguish.

Agellius,

I can deeply appreciate the questions you are asking. As stated at the beginning of my post, I originally posted this on Mormon Matters and as such there is some history here that you don’t have that answer all your questions. I’m not sure I can really do justice to each of my arguments quickly. If it’s okay with you, can I take a bit of time to post links to the relevant past posts that explain. I’ll have to do this in a few comments, so bare with me.

Let me first state that I do *not* believe Mormons are “Trinitarian” in the way *you* probably define that term. What I actually believe is that Mormons are more or less Social Trinitarians. (I wrote about this at length here.) You may look that up on Wikipedia, it’s not a term I’m making up.

In fact, if you will allow me to define “substance” or “being” as meaning “will” (see this post for details) then in fact I *do* believe that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three persons that are one Being/Substance and thus Mormons are fully creedal Trinitarians not just Social Trinitarians.

Now my past experience with creedal Christians is that they will not accept that “substance” or “being” can mean “one will”. This isn’t physical enough for some reason that is never explained. BUT I’ve never had a creedal Christian actually define those terms for themselves either.

My honest impression is that part of creedal Christianity is to believe in certain words that must never ever be defined and that the act of defining them is in and off itself considered heresy. I wrote about this last problem at length here and here.

I think if you will read my links this will define what I meant when I said Mormons are “Trinitarian.”

(I’ll answer your other questions in another comment)

“You write, “The popular Christian idea that God has no physical presence, because God is everywhere present fully, is thus eliminated as a possibility. First, I’m confused by your distinction between God having a physical presence and God being “everywhere present fully” — if he has no physical presence, in what sense do you say he is “fully present” everywhere?”

I wrote this line in response to two Evangelical Scholars that (incorrectly) said the following about Mormon beliefs:

“According to Evangelical theology God is personally present everywhere, something that is just not possible in the Latter-day Saint view. According to the LDS view God is not personally in the room with us as we write this review. [Edit note: not correct.] He would be aware of what we do and he could influence what we do, but he himself is not in the room with us. [Not correct] In the Evangelical view God is personally present as we type these words. This view appears to be the necessary interpretation of passages like Psalm 139:7—12 in which David rhetorically asks “Where can I flee from your presence?” The point is that everywhere David could possibly go, the Lord would already be personally present there to help and sustain him.”

(For the moment, I’ll overlook the problem of Gabriel claiming to stand in the presence of God.)

If this is a correct representation of Evangelical beliefs (or at least of their own and thus of some Evangelicals) then clearly they do believe God is everywhere present though not physically present anywhere. Thus my statement is correct as is. There is nothing factually wrong with it. I’m only stating that –

A. Creedal Christians believe God has no physical presence but instead is personally present everywhere (whatever that means)

B. The Book of Mormon says he does indeed have physical shape and form.

C. Thus the Book of Mormon is at odds with the creedal formula at least on this one point.

You may personally disagree that God is present everywhere like Mosser and Owens believe, but my statement is still correct for many a creedal Christian. I can’t possibly respond to all variants of Christianity or even all variants of creedal Christianity. I hope you will accept this statement in the light it was intended — as a completely accurate statement about many (I believe most) creedal Christians. Not as an attempt to pidgeon hole all creedal Christians.

“But to call that doctrine “trinitarian”, in my view is to co-opt the word to represent an essentially different concept, since it is of the essence of the definition of “Trinity” that the three Persons comprise a single substance. It would be like using the word “quadruped” to refer to two two-legged animals rather than a single four-legged one: Yes, four legs are involved, but by definition the word refers to one animal, not two.”

Okay, let me respond to this now and then I have to go to bed.

I am not clear here if you honestly didn’t know that “Trinitarian” can refer to people that believe in a Social Trinity or not. If you were unaware, then that is my explanation.

However, my experience is that often creedal Christians will insist to me that Social Trinitarian isn’t a legitimate use of the word Trinitarian. Only their definition counts and the rest are dishonestly trying to co-opt the word. (I’m in no way suggesting you were saying this.)

My counter logic to this is simple:

The word “Trinitarian” is often used to mean “Social Trinitarian” and the fact that it’s widely used that way makes the word mean *that* because words mean how they are used and nothing more. Personal rejection of that definition isn’t sufficient to make it illegitimate. That would be like taking the word “quadruped” and defining it only refers to animals with four legs that have a tail and then insisting everyone that disagrees with you and think it means also animals with four legs that have no tail are being dishonest.

Also, I DO NOT assume that the “orthodox” Christian doctrine of Trinity is false. As per my first comment back to you, I simply see it as undefined. I’m quite open to the possibility that “oneness of being/substance” means precisely “oneness of will,” for example. Thus I would see creedal Trinity doctrine and Mormon Trinity doctrine as one and the same, just the Mormon version as more fully defined version of the two. (Possibly there are other formulations that would make Mormon and Orthodox Christian Trinity synonymous. I could probably spend 10 minutes and think of 6 different such formulations that make our views the same.)

To use an analogy, it’s like saying “Joe isn’t a dog” and “Joe is a man.” I feel the same way about the creedal Trinity. I don’t know if I agree or disagree with it because as far as I’ve been able to get straight answers from creedal Christians, it’s undefined.

Thus I can’t really say, for sure, if I am or am not an orthodox Trinitarian. I simply know that I am roughly a Social Trinitarian (this is only an approximate match, but a pretty good one so far for me) which may or may not be the same as an orthodox Trinitarian.

One more thing, Agellius. I am always worried that I come across as harsh in print when I don’t intend it. I hope you will forgive this. Let me assure you that I am quite serious about my attempts to try to understand the orthodox Trinity doctrine and that I’m quite serious in my statements that — at this time at least — do not believe it is defined.

I’ve talked to a lot of Trinitarians of the orthodox nature. Some were really modalists and didn’t know it (“God is like Ice, steam and water”) some where really Tritheists and didn’t know it. Many understood that they were neither of the above, but could only explain that they weren’t modalists or tritheists using circular definitions. i.e. “Person is Personal aspects of God” or “Being is the Substance of God” whereas “The Substance of God is His Being” or even “Person is not used in the normal sense of the word” (that’s for sure)

In my post I gave a link to, here is the definition I found:

“In modern philosophical usage the term person means a separate and distinct rational individual. But the tri-personality of God is not a numerical or essential trinity of three beings (like Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob), for this would be tritheism; nor is it, on the other hand, merely a threefold aspect and mode of manifestation, in the Sabellian or Swedenborgian sense; but it is a real, objective, and eternal, though ineffable, distinction in the one Divine being, with a corresponding threefold revelation of this being in the works of creation, redemption, and sanctification. Hence the distinction between the immanent, intrinsic (or ontological) trinity and the extrinsic or economical) trinity; in other words, between the trinity of essence and the trinity of manifestation.”

We have here an admission that “person” doesn’t mean “person” but other than that, I can’t make heads or tails of it. They might as well have said “God is Abracadabra”

Now I get the part about the Trinity being “corresponding threefold revelation of this being in the works of creation, redemption, and sanctification.” But please note that this is what I believe to a T. There is one God that is made up of three literal Persons (I define that term exactly how evey person does, not in a circular way) and they are the Father (Creator), Son (Redeemer), and Holy Ghost (Sanctifier).

Further more, this “explanation” does nothing to define ‘person’ whatsoever. It might as well be mapping ‘person’ to ‘how God reveals Himself’ and then adding ‘oh, but it’s not a mode.’

So thus it is a ‘mode’ as we’d normally think of that word but it’s declaring that it’s not. All I’ve done now is create yet another word that needs to be defined in some way other than how people normally use it or understand it.

Do you see how I’d feel this is double speak rather than a serious attempt to define terms?

But we could play this game all day. I could, for example, tell you that I’m a Trinitarian (of the orthodox variety) and a Mormon. You could then ask how that is possible and I could merely respond “because God is three persons and one being.” You could then say “don’t you believe the Father and the Son have bodies” and I could respond, “exactly, thus they are one being.”

I would think it would be natural at that point for you to ask me to define how *I* mean the word ‘being.’ I could then say, “well, n modern philosophical usage the term “being” means a separate and distinct rational individual. But the tri-body nature of God is not a numerical or essential trinity of three beings (like Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob), for this would be tritheism; nor is it, on the other hand, merely a threefold aspect and mode of manifestation, in the Sabellian or Swedenborgian sense; but it is a real, objective, and eternal, though ineffable, distinction in the one Divine being, with a corresponding threefold body of this being in the works of creation, redemption, and sanctification. Hence the distinction between the immanent, intrinsic (or ontological) trinity and the extrinsic or economical trinity; in other words, between the trinity of essence and the trinity of manifestation.”

When I took my first class in complex analysis, I was struck by how much the God of classical theism resembled an entire function on the complex plane.

Except for the Incarnation, but then that was pretty much retrofitted onto classical theism.

Vader,

Do a post on this sometime explaining further. It sounds intriguing. I can’t intuit what you mean just by what you said. I like the idea of God being mapable to a complex plane, however. What ramifications would that have for the Trinity doctrine in all it’s formulations?

Agellius,

I suppose I should throw one more comment in to be fair.

While I personally *currently* believe the Trinity doctrine is basically undefined, I fully recognize that I might be wrong. It is possible that it’s merely very complex, so complex that only the most educated of Catholic/Protestants could take me through the steps and definitions I’d need to understand what they mean by it. (I’m smart enough to follow things if explained from the beginning on up, but bear in mind that I’m not deeply educated on theology so using a word I’m not familiar with doesn’t help without taking the time to explain it.)

If the later were the case, then I fully understand that you couldn’t possibly give me a quick response and explain youself. But if this is the case I would invite you to take the time to really start at the beginning and explain it. If you really do believe something that isn’t undefined (as I currently believe) you will be able to do this, though it will require a lot of effort, I’d imagine.

I’d be fine with you doing this in steps on your blog or (better yet) contacting me via email and emailing me.

I dumped a whole lot of info here not because I wanted to argue but because I am used to being misunderstood and felt it’s impossible to understand what I’m saying without a lot of info. But, of course, lots of info often just ends up confusing the issue further.

Also, reading your blog, its obvious your well educated. (I couldn’t tell one way or the other from your short post) so I hope you won’t be offended by my speculation that you hadn’t heard for social trinitarianism. Being well educated, you probably have.

It’s possible instead that you simply never thought of the possiblity that Mormon Trinity beliefs could be fit into such a category. You probably have never considered any possibility other than that all Mormons interpret their beliefs in a purely tritheistic way. (Which is simply not true but a very common misundestanding perpetuated by other religions about Mormons.)

You write, “Let me assure you that I am quite serious about my attempts to try to understand the orthodox Trinity doctrine and that I’m quite serious in my statements that — at this time at least — do not believe it is defined.”

I assure you that you don’t come across as harsh, and I have no doubt that you are serious about attempting to understand the “orthodox Trinity doctrine”. I find this kind of discussion fascinating and appreciate the opportunity to participate. However I’m unclear what you mean by “the orthodox Trinity doctrine”. For me the orthodox Trinity doctrine is that which has been defined by the Catholic Church. Doctrines which differ from this I consider unorthodox. So I guess my question is really, what do you mean by “orthodox”?

As you point out, you can’t be expected to respond to “all variants of Christianity or even all variants of creedal Christianity”. But by the same token all variants of Christianity and Christian doctrines can’t be lumped together under the heading “orthodox” or even “creedal” in any meaningful way, precisely because there are so many variations. If they must be lumped together under those headings in order to distinguish them from LDS Christianity and doctrine, then I can’t help but assume that the “orthodox” formulation of the Trinity refers, in its essentials, to the Catholic formulation, since that is the ultimate root of the other formulations. If you don’t mean the Catholic formulation, but instead are gathering a number of the modified formulations (including the Catholic) and sort of averaging them out, or trying to include aspects of all of them under a single umbrella, I will find it difficult to discuss the subject in a meaningful way.

You write, “What I actually believe is that Mormons are more or less Social Trinitarians.”

I read the Wiki article (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_trinity), but frankly I found it unclear. I can only say that to the extent it implies that the Trinity are one in the sense that they love each other, and in that sense only, then I would agree with you that it is compatible with LDS doctrine, but not with Catholic doctrine. I would just suggest that when saying you are a trinitarian, for the sake of clarity it might be advisable to specify that you are a social trinitarian.

You write, “if you will allow me to define “substance” or “being” as meaning “will” (see this post for details) then in fact I *do* believe that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three persons that are one Being/Substance ….”

I’m sorry, but I can’t allow that. : ) “Will” and “substance” are not the same thing. My handy-dandy Outlook dictionary defines “will” as “the power to decide” or “the part of mind that makes decisions”. “Substance” on the other hand is “the unchanging essence of something”.

If you believe that God the Father is by nature a man, then his substance is that of a man. Possibly you would say that he is man having reached the highest fulfillment of his nature, which is that of a god (though I’m not sure how official that belief is). In that case his substance is that of a god. But whether he is a man or a god, or both, his will is not his substance, but merely “the part of his mind that makes decisions”.

Actually, this brings up some interesting points about the physics of God as understood in Mormonism.

It is official doctrine (Doctrine and Covenants) that spirit and matter are species of the same genus. In fact, spirit is described as a more refined or pure form of matter — I am tempted to call it perfected matter, though that expression is not present in scripture.

God likewise is spoken of fairly officially as a perfected Man. At least, the idea that when we are perfected, we then partake of the divine nature, is no invention of Joseph Smith; you may recognize the words from 1 John. Joseph Smith elaborated the concept of course. Thus perfected men become God. This is not quite the same as saying that God is perfected Man, of course, but the idea that God and man are the same species at different points in their evolution was the essence of the King Follett discourse and it is widely believed in the Church, with the caveats I offered earlier (we don’t know if God was ever a sinful Man or whether he was the first Man or there is an infinite regress of Gods, though the latter is a common belief among Mormons.)

There is common theme here: Spirit is perfected matter. God is perfected man.

To me, this is mildly reminiscent of the Platonic notion of ideals. Spirit the ideal matter? God the ideal man? Worth giving some thought to.

Agellius,

I like your response.

Let me just say, that now that I know you to be Catholic, we can, for the sake of argument, take “Trinity Doctrine” to mean “what you believe you believe about the Trinity being Catholic” and I will, from this point forward, use “social Trinitarian” to refer to my beliefs if I use the word “Trinity.”

I do not promise to follow this rules outside of this discussion, however, as I’m afraid I don’t believe Catholics own the word “Trinity” and I won’t support that idea. I don’t even (at least not yet) believe Catholics even have a definition for the word “Trinity.”

(more in a minute)

Agellis, you said: “…I can’t help but assume that the “orthodox” formulation of the Trinity refers, in its essentials, to the Catholic formulation, since that is the ultimate root of the other formulations. If you don’t mean the Catholic formulation, but instead are gathering a number of the modified formulations (including the Catholic) and sort of averaging them out, or trying to include aspects of all of them under a single umbrella, I will find it difficult to discuss the subject in a meaningful way.”

This is really a restatement of everything I said, but you just didn’t realize it.

As previously stated, I do not know what “Trinity” means. I don’t (yet) believe you know what it means. I think it’s a doctrine that is undefined except when needed to deny other doctines. This is my honest opinion that may or may not be correct.

If you believe me that *I* believe this (I’m not asking you to), then you’ll realize that it’s impossible for me to have a definition for “Orthodox Trinity” other than “the doctrine Catholics (and Protestants) claim they believe that in fact has no defintion.” Thus I don’t intend it as an average or anything specific at all. Nor could I under any circumstance prior to having been told a consistent definition for it.

That’s why I am willing to, for the sake of this conversation, take “Trinity doctrine” to mean essentially “whatever it is that you believe in that I don’t understand and you have yet to define for me.” Just don’t lose sight of the fact that “orthodox Trinity” (which we will now call “Trinity” for short) doesn’t mean anything to me. I honestly don’t know if it includes or excludes my personal beliefs. So I’m unwilling to even say I disagree with it or that it’s seperate for distinct from “Social Trinity.”

(more later)

“I read the Wiki article (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_trinity), but frankly I found it unclear. I can only say that to the extent it implies that the Trinity are one in the sense that they love each other, and in that sense only, then I would agree with you that it is compatible with LDS doctrine, but not with Catholic doctrine.”

Actually, just to be clear, that may well be what a Social Trinitarian is, but I am only accepting a rough match on this. I do NOT believe God is ONLY one via a loving relationship. I believe it goes a lot deeper than that.

You said: ““Will” and “substance” are not the same thing. My handy-dandy Outlook dictionary defines “will” as “the power to decide” or “the part of mind that makes decisions”. “Substance” on the other hand is “the unchanging essence of something”.”

It’s against the rules to try to hold me to a single definition of the word “will.” Here is what dictionary.com says:

1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions: the freedom of the will.
2. power of choosing one’s own actions: to have a strong or a weak will.
3. the act or process of using or asserting one’s choice; volition: My hands are obedient to my will.
4. wish or desire: to submit against one’s will.
5. purpose or determination, often hearty or stubborn determination; willfulness: to have the will to succeed.
6. the wish or purpose as carried out, or to be carried out: to work one’s will.

When I referred to God’s substance as being “His Will” I was really using it in the same sense that the Bible might say “Jesus is the Word of God.” It’s literal, but it’s not the first definition. I’d say I’m using it as per definition #5 and #6. God’s essence is his purposes as he has and will carry them out. That is to say, God’s will is His character.

Now that I’ve made my definition of “will” clear (and shown it to not be a private definition – not that there is anything wrong with private definitions as long as you’re willing to define your terms) I need to point out that I understand one’s moral will and character to BE the unchanging essence of something (at least if it’s living.)

So right off the bat we have a problem. I CAN see why you wouldn’t understand the creeds to fit Mormon doctrine because you define “substance” as meaning “not just will.” But I DO not accept that definition. TO ME your definition of “substance” does in fact fit the Mormon doctrine of Trinity. Thus I am a full Trinitarian, not just a social one as per your own definition of “substance.”

But this isn’t a satisfying answer, is it? Of course not. I submit that the reason why is because your definition was circular. You actually defined “substance” as “the unchanging essence of something” but of course that’s circular too. “Substance” and “Essence” are both translations of a single word in Latin found in Latin creeds. It’s not fair to define something in terms of itself.

But you added one more point: you are saying that “substance” is “essence” but not “will.” Thus, so far, your definition of “substance” equates to “not will.” You are only explaining what it is not and its definition seems suspiciously aimed at excluding me rather than explain to me. But it is still legitimate for me to ask you what you actually did mean rather than what you didn’t mean. Do you see what I am saying? This is exactly the problem I always bump into. Trinitarians call tell me all day what they don’t believe, they just can’t tell me what they do believe.

thought of one more clarifying point.

You state that the substance of man is man.

This is also circular and doesn’t help me understand what you mean.

If someone were to ask me “what’s the substance of man?” I’d immediately think of two possible answers:

1. Man’s substance is his chemical make up that forms cells, that forms him.
2. Man’s substance is who he chooses to be (i.e. character.)

I do not accept that man’s substance is man is a meaningful statement in and of itself.

Again, if you had a definition for substance, even if it’s a private one, I’d gladly insert that into the discussion and give you my honest re-evaluation of what you are asking me about my beliefs.

Bruce,

my experience has also been that most supposedly orthodox believers describe the Trinity in modalistic terms. On the other hand, I’ve read a Mormon scholar who says that “of one substance” simply means sharing the same ontogenical nature, such that it would be accurate to say that you and I also share the same substance (we are both formally human). I also read quite a bit of recent Mormon scholarship showing that Joseph Smith’s denunciations of the doctrine of the trinity were clearly denunciations of modalism.

So it seems to me that orthodox trinitarianism is either simply affirming that the father and the son and the Holy Ghost share the same divine nature–i.e., they aren’t each divine in some separate, incommensurable way–or else orthodox trinitarianism isn’t a positive statement of anything, but simply a denial that orthodox Christianity is polytheist while also denying that the father and the son and the spirit are just a pretense for one Being.

If the first version is correct, it would explain the accusation leveled at the 16th C. Spanish Jesuit who is known as the foremost interpreter of Aquinas–his name escapes me at the moment–that he was in danger of elevating Being or Nature (in the Aristotelian sense) above God, sorta like Orson Pratt did in response to the same sorts of intellectual questions.

Perhaps Agellius could shed some light?

Follow up:

if I’m correct about what ‘substance’ means in this conversation, then man’s substance isn’t DNA or anything physical. Its what makes a man a man as opposed to a monkey or a table. The ‘substance’ of a table is that it has legs and a flat surface and a particular kind of purpose.

Geez. You guys are enough to drive a fellow to Nominalism.

Bruce writes, “Now that I’ve made my definition of “will” clear ….”

I hope you’ll excuse me if I dispute that. Defining God’s will as being the same as his substance is, to me, about as confusing as it gets. Even using definitions 5 and 6, I can’t see any way of equating will with substance.

I also dispute that my definition of “substance” was circular, since there are distinctions between substance and essence. But in any case, how about this definition of “substance” which does not include the word “essence”: “something that exists by itself and in which accidents or attributes inhere”.

Or Aristotle’s definition: “We call ‘SUBSTANCE’ the simple bodies, i.e. earth and fire and water and everything else of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and DIVINE BEINGS and the parts of these. All these are called SUBSTANCES because they are not predicated of a subject, but everything else is predicated of them.”

Or this article on the term: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14322c.htm

You can use “substance” as synonymous with “will” if you want, but if your goal is to understand the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity then in order to accomplish that you will need to know what definitions the Church uses in her explanations.

You write, “You are only explaining what it is not and its definition seems suspiciously aimed at excluding me rather than explain to me. … This is exactly the problem I always bump into. Trinitarians call tell me all day what they don’t believe, they just can’t tell me what they do believe.”

At this point I may say that you begin to sound harsh. I would appreciate your giving me the benefit of the doubt that if what I say is not clear to you, there is some explanation other than my being intentionally obtuse.

In an effort to cut to the chase, let me say this: Srictly speaking, the doctrine of the Trinity is merely this: That the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three distinct persons, and each is God, yet there is only one God. This is what we believe has been revealed by God to the Church. Men may try to put it in terms that they can more easily wrap their heads around and analyze, or try to delve more deeply into it using the methods of philosophy. But the doctrine boils down to what I just said, whether explained in terms of substances, natures, persons, etc.; or just stated simply, as Cardinal Newman does here:

‘This is the teaching of the Athanasian Creed; viz. that the One Personal God … at once is Father, is Son, is Holy Ghost, Each of whom is that One Personal God in the fulness of His Being and Attributes; so that the Father is all that is meant by the word “God,” as if we knew nothing of Son, or of Spirit; and in like manner the Son and the Spirit are Each by Himself all that is meant by the word, as if the Other Two were unknown; moreover, that by the word “God” is meant nothing over and above what is meant by “the Father,” or by “the Son,” or by “the Holy Ghost;” and that the Father is in no sense the Son, nor the Son the Holy Ghost, nor the Holy Ghost the Father. Such is the prerogative of the Divine Infinitude, that that One and Single Personal Being, the Almighty God, is really Three, while He is absolutely One.’

http://www.newmanreader.org/works/grammar/chapter5-2.html

A little later Newman writes, “There are … no terms in the foregoing exposition which do not admit of a plain sense, and they are there used in that sense; and, moreover, that sense is what I have called real, for the words in their ordinary use stand for things. The words, Father, Son, Spirit, He, One, and the rest, are not abstract terms, but concrete, and adapted to excite images. And these words thus simple and clear, are embodied in simple, clear, brief, categorical propositions. There is nothing abstruse either in the terms themselves, or in their setting. It is otherwise of course with formal theological treatises on the subject of the dogma. There we find such words as substance, essence, existence, form, subsistence, notion, circumincession; and, though these are far easier to understand than might at first sight be thought, still they are doubtless addressed to the intellect, and can only command a notional assent.”

In other words, as I said, the technical philosophical terms are intended to lend precision to definitions of the doctrine, but they are not the doctrine itself. If we are tripped up in trying to agree on their definitions, it may be advisable to forget them in favor of simpler modes of expression.

Adam:

“Sharing the same substance” does not equate to “possessing the same nature”, as you and I both possess the nature of a man. Because even though we do both possess that nature, each of us is a separate substance, whereas the members of the Trinity are not separate substances.

Although, just to confuse the matter, when talking about God (in our view) you are talking about a being of a nature which is absolutely unique, such that when we say the Father, Son and Holy Spirit possess the same nature, that automatically means they possess the same substance, since there is only one substance of that nature in existence.

Adam writes, “if I’m correct about what ’substance’ means in this conversation, then man’s substance isn’t DNA or anything physical. Its what makes a man a man as opposed to a monkey or a table. The ’substance’ of a table is that it has legs and a flat surface and a particular kind of purpose.”

What you are describing here is what I would call nature, not substance. Nature describes what a thing is, substance is the thing itself.

Adam says: “So it seems to me that orthodox trinitarianism is either simply affirming that the father and the son and the Holy Ghost share the same divine nature–i.e., they aren’t each divine in some separate, incommensurable way–or else orthodox trinitarianism isn’t a positive statement of anything, but simply a denial that orthodox Christianity is polytheist while also denying that the father and the son and the spirit are just a pretense for one Being.”

Sorry, I’m catching up.

I am of the same opinion as you at this point. I believe that Trinitarianism is either a statement that the members of the Godhead are all divine in the same way — in which case Mormons are clearly orthodox Trinitarians — or it’s not a definition of beliefs only a denial of them.

Now I’ll read Agellius’ posts.

Agellius,

I apologize if you think I sounded harsh when I said: “Trinitarians call tell me all day what they don’t believe, they just can’t tell me what they do believe.”

I do not want to be or sound harsh. “Sounding” is always a problem on a blog because all you have is the print.

That being said, I do not back down from this statement, I only wish I had found a better way to express it to avoid misunderstanding.

It is an objective fact that it’s easy for Trinitarians to tell me what they don’t believe (you, for example, don’t believe “will” or “character” can ever be equated to “substance”) but extremely difficult for them to tell me what they do believe. Your own explanation (which I will need quite a bit of time to digest and then respond to) is a perfect example of this.

I do not understand how such a statement is in any way similar to an accusation of “being intentionally obtuse.” But if that is what you came away with understanding in my statement, then I retract the statement as inaccurate and will try again to explain what I mean.

What I mean is simply this: I can understand you feel my beliefs (in so far as you understand them at this point) are different from your Trinity doctrine. I can’t understand why. Your further explanation and myriad of articles does not make sense to me on a simple reading. It uses terms I’m not familiar with that clearly don’t mean the same thing to you that they do to me.

For example, you reference an Aristotle saying:

“We call ‘SUBSTANCE’ the simple bodies, i.e. earth and fire and water and everything else of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and DIVINE BEINGS and the parts of these. All these are called SUBSTANCES because they are not predicated of a subject, but everything else is predicated of them.”

But this doesn’t help me at all. At the outset, it’s clear that Aristotle is just plain wrong. Fire, Earth, water are not simple substance that make up all other things. If I am to attempt to take this definition literally but move it up to use modern science, I would understand Aristotle as saying “substance” is the atoms (they’re called atoms because you can’t break them down any further and still have them be an element) that make things up. If I make this assumption, then “substance” now has a definitive definition for me that makes sense. After all, atoms are in fact that which all the physical world is predicated on but are predicated on nothing. (Well, if you count quantum physics that’s not really true, but for the moment let’s assume it is for the sake of argument.)

Now this *would* make sense to me, but tells me nothing about your understandings of God since you believe He is in no way physical. i.e. by this definition God has no substance at all. Thus I am even more confused now as to what you actually were originally trying to say.

I promise, I’m not trying to be difficult here. I hope you can appreciate the huge mountain you are asking me to climb. (One that I’m willing to climb if you will let me.)

Now I realize that you did NOT mean God has no substance. I’m not trying to put words in your mouth. My point is that your explanation didn’t explain anything to me based on my current understanding. I’m still at a loss as to what you mean by substance. Now this may well be not a problem with what you are saying and only with a language gap that exists. Or it might be that you are saying something that doesn’t make sense or is a logical contradiction. As of yet, it’s impossible to say.

I promise that I’ll read the articles you posted, though that will take a while. I’ll do a post later (probably several days, so check back if interested) and I’ll attempt to explain what I did and didn’t understand.

One last thing, and feel free to respond to this if you like: You said the underlying doctrine of Trinity is “merely this: That the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three distinct persons, and each is God, yet there is only one God.”

I just want to be very blunt about this. I have no troubles whatsoever affirm exactly the above statement as worded. What you stated above is my beliefs.

In saying this, I am NOT claiming I believe the same as you nor that the above words mean anything the same to me that they do to you.

Upon further reflection, Agellius, I wish to reword one paragraph above to avoid any misunderstanding or cause more feelings of harshness:

“It is an objective fact that it’s easier for Trinitarians to tell me that they disagree with my beliefs then it is for them to explain their beliefs in such a way that I can understand their beliefs and thus understand why they disagree.”

I want to phrase it this way so that it’s not an accusation against Trinitarians. I wish to remain open to the possibility that it’s me that just doesn’t understand yet, not that the Trinity doctrine simply has no defintion and thus can never be explained (though I’m open to that possiblity as well).

At the heart of the issue is that I *can* affirm the Trinity doctrine exactly as you worded it. I can then go on to explain how it fits my beliefs and I am *always* told “no, you misunderstand.”

You know, I just noticed a commonality I missed previously between Mormon beliefs and Trinitarian beliefs:

“For my part, I would not say that he has no physical presence because he’s present everywhere, but rather that he has no physical presence because he’s not a physical being. Like goodness, truth and beauty, he’s a thing that just is not made of matter”

I believe this is a description of the character and moral will of God. As previously stated, this is to me the essence of God.

If I think of Character and Moral Will as being the essence of God, I can agree with this statement. “God” in that sense, is not physical, yet is still an objective reality just as morality is not physical but an objective reality.

(Please note: I accept that the word “God” has more than one use and definition.)

Of course this doesn’t fully express my beliefs. For God to be truly God in my mind, he can’t merely be morality or goodness, He has to be the embodiement of it. Thus God ‘essence’ (as I’m using the word) is not all of God, merely the “the basic, real, and invariable nature of a thing or its significant individual feature or features.”

God’s Moral Will or Character IS the essence of God to me as the dictionary defines the word “essence.” God is God because He’s Godly in Nature. (i.e. His character. I am not using “nature” in the Catholic sense here, I suspect, but just the normal dictionary sense, i.e. “the particular combination of qualities belonging to a person, animal, thing…”)

Interesting.

My previous posts here and here and here seem relevant to this new discovery. (I do this to capture my thoughts to review them later. Not really expecting anyone to read them.)

I’ve tended to view God as a community of perfected Persons. Is this the same as social trinitarianism? Except that as a Mormon, while I worship the Father in the name of the Son by the power of the Holy Ghost, there is an implication that there are vast numbers of other Persons who are in the community we call God, who we do not worship as Persons because that isn’t the order of Heaven. I’m not sure henotheism is correct for the latter aspect, but I’m still tempted to describe mysefl as a henotheistic social trinitarian.

I think henotheistic is an approximation but a misleading one. When you think of henotheism you have a single high God that all others are beneath. This isn’t true for Mormonism.

I completely agree that “God” in the Mormon sense is “a community of perfected Persons” but I’d added “that share a single moral will, nature, and character.” (Using non-Catholic definitions here, just common dictionary usage.)

I personally feel this is closer to Trinitarianism as Agellius defined it. (Well, currently “Trinitarianism” but eventually I should reword it “Infinitarianism” which might be the best description of Mormon Doctrine of Deity possible).

Here are some interesting points that I think get overlooked:

1. Mormons worship the persons of God in unity. That is, we do worship all of them as one but not individually. They are “one God.” This naturally and logically falls out of the fact that they are all one in moral will. (How can two people with the same moral will every differ on an issue?) Even Bruce McConkie insisted on this fact more than once. (He being the most Trietheistic of all the Mormon Apostles.)
2. We use the word “God” in different ways. We sometimes mean “the entire group” and sometimes just one person, particulary the Father. However, this logically falls out of our doctrine of divine investiture which logically falls out of God’s divinity being the Moral Will. It only makes sense that if you have “community” (for lack of a better word) that all share a single character and moral will then any one of them represents the whole of them and vice versa. In fact, it couldn’t have been logical any other way. This, to me, is what “oness” is.

I think what we have here is a realization that the word “person” has more than one meaning. You *can* think of God as being a single person. You think of the “community” as being the physical make up of God. (In much the same way our cells make us up.)

But you can also think of God as being any person in that make up (unlike the cells) because they each have their own individuality.

What constitutes a “person” anyhow? It’s just a word that we use to express the idea of a single conciousness of any sort. (Same as the word “being”)

That’s why I say I can accept, from a certain point of view anyhow, the idea that “God” is not physical. If you think of “God” not as the community, nor the persons that make up the community, but instead as the common nature and conciousness between them. Again, this is not the way I’d normally use the word, but I’m willing to allow the word to stretch to include this idea because I think this puts Catholic Trinity much closer to the truth than I expected and I’d rather think of Catholic Trinity as “true” (or mostly true) rather than as false.

Bruce:

You write, “I do not understand how such a statement is in any way similar to an accusation of ‘being intentionally obtuse.’”

What sounded like an accusation of intentional obtuseness was your statement, “You are only explaining what it is not and its definition seems **suspiciously aimed** at excluding me rather than explain to me.” But really, it’s no big deal. It’s clear to me that you’re not trying to pick a fight. Sometimes things just don’t come across the way we intend.

You write, ‘It is an objective fact that it’s easy for Trinitarians to tell me what they don’t believe … but extremely difficult for them to tell me what they do believe.’

I don’t agree. I am not having an extremely difficult time telling you what I believe.

You write, “it’s clear that Aristotle is just plain wrong. Fire, Earth, water are not simple substance that make up all other things.”

Aristotle doesn’t say, in the paragraph I quoted, that those substances make up all other things. He said that “earth and fire and water ***and everything else of the sort***, and in general bodies and the things composed of them” are substances. Granted he didn’t have the degree of understanding of matter that we have, but this is no reason to be confused by his definition of “substance”, as far as I can see.

You write, “If I am to attempt to take this definition literally but move it up to use modern science, I would understand Aristotle as saying ‘substance’ is the atoms (they’re called atoms because you can’t break them down any further and still have them be an element) that make things up.”

If you did that you would be miscontruing the definition. He didn’t limit “substance” to “the stuff of which things are made”. He said substance is the stuff of which things are made *and* the things which are composed of them. So a piece of wood is a substance, and so is a chair made of wood.

You write, “After all, atoms are in fact that which all the physical world is predicated on but are predicated on nothing.”

He didn’t say substance is that “on which all things are predicated”. He said substances are that *of* which things are predicated: For example, hardness is predicated of a diamond, therefore a diamond is a substance, but hardness is not; thus you can say “diamonds are hard”, but you can’t say “hardness is a diamond”.

You write, “Now this *would* make sense to me, but tells me nothing about your understandings of God since you believe He is in no way physical. i.e. by this definition God has no substance at all.”

A thing doesn’t have to be physical to be a substance. It only has to be a thing of which things may be predicated. Thus omnipotence may be predicated of God, but not God of omnipotence. Again omnipotence, since it doesn’t exist on its own but is only predicated of things that exist, is not a substance, but God is.

You write, “I hope you can appreciate the huge mountain you are asking me to climb. (One that I’m willing to climb if you will let me.)”

I’m not stopping you, brother. Climb away. : )

You write, “I realize that you did NOT mean God has no substance.”

Your phrasing indicates a continued misunderstanding of “substance”. Substance (in the sense under discussion) is not something you have, it’s something of which you are or are not one.

You write, “I promise that I’ll read the articles you posted, though that will take a while.”

Actually I only posted a link to one article, and that was only in the event that the two preceding definitions were insufficient to enlighten you. No need to promise me to read it, it’s only for your benefit. (The other link, regarding Newman, was only to provide you with the context of the paragraphs I quoted.)

You write, “You said the underlying doctrine of Trinity is ‘merely this: That the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three distinct persons, and each is God, yet there is only one God.’ … I have no troubles whatsoever affirm exactly the above statement as worded.”

I must apologize for having misspoken: When I said that doctrine was “merely this”, by “merely” I meant to highlight its simplicity, I didn’t mean to imply that the doctrine in its entirety was contained in that one sentence. But the doctrine in its entirety is contained in the paragraph I quoted from Newman. I believe that is where you may have trouble fitting it to the LDS doctrine of the Godhead.

Agellius,

Thanks for the response.

Like I said, I’ll have to read and reread everything carefully before responding. I’m afraid most of what you are saying makes little sense to me at this point. In particular, I’m not convinced I misunderstood Aristotle yet. I do think you clarified one point I had missed: he calls “substance” the basic elements (he says “simple bodies”) plus all that they make up.

But this is a very physical definition. In fact, it has no meaning outside physical. You went on to say: “A thing doesn’t have to be physical to be a substance. It only has to be a thing of which things may be predicated.” Then you gave the example of omnipotence being predicated of God.

What might be helpful here is if you can give me an example of a non-physical substance without using God (which I believe to be physical and you don’t so it doesn’t help) as an example. Don’t use spirit either. I believe that is physical also. Waves are physical too. So is Energy.

Also, you said: “I don’t agree. I am not having an extremely difficult time telling you what I believe.” then took expection. But I believe I corrected the original statement. The problem with my original wording was that it might be construed to lay blame.

But you are, indeed, having difficulty explaining your beliefs in a way that someone outside your faith could understand. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing, however. Explaining quantum physics is rather difficult too, yet true. (However, I don’t personally believe that analogy applies here. For better or worse, someone can give me an exact formula for quantum physics. But I’ll continue to climb the mountain.)

Agellius,

Will you accept the following as the definition of “predicate” in the way you are using it: “to found or derive (a statement, action, etc.);”

I want to be sure your using a “dictionary definition” here.

If you are, then a “substance” is anything which is derived. I could see how that could be non-physical.

However, becareful in accepting this definition, it opens a can of worms since in essence a substance is then only that which something else is derived from. It would be hard to think of anything that isn’t a “substance” of something else. So I feel like this can’t be what you meant.

Bruce:

You write, “But this is a very physical definition. In fact, it has no meaning outside physical.”

In my view you are simply mistaken. Aristotle’s definition does have meaning when applied to non-physical substances. Your failure to grasp its meaning when so applied does not prove there isn’t one.

You ask for an example of a non-physical substance other than God or spirits, but I don’t understand why I need to give such. God and spirits are the examples. You give no logical reason why the word “substance” may not by applied to them, you merely assert it.

Whether we agree that God is physical or we don’t, is immaterial. Even if we consider spirits as only theoretical beings, logically the word “substance” may still be applied to them. This discussion, as I see it, is not about proving anything concerning the existence or nature of actual beings, it’s about understanding a belief.

You write, “But you are, indeed, having difficulty explaining your beliefs in a way that someone outside your faith could understand.”

I would say rather that (insofar as I may truly be said to be having difficulty) I am having difficulty explaining my beliefs in a way that *you* can understand. But why you can’t understand it is another question. I see no particular reason to attribute the difficulty to myself or my beliefs.

The doctrine of the Trinity, admittedly, may be hard for a non-Catholic to believe. I admit also that it may be hard for anyone, Catholic or non-Catholic, to fully grasp in all its aspects such that all mystery is eliminated. But I don’t admit that the doctrine, when stated simply, as Newman did, is hard to understand. As Newman pointed out, “these words [are] simple and clear, [and] are embodied in simple, clear, brief, categorical propositions”.

I have no problem with you finding it unbelievable. I deny that it’s not understandable.

Bruce:

“Predicate” in the sense in which I am using it is “to assert or affirm something about the subject of a statement”.

“You ask for an example of a non-physical substance other than God or spirits, but I don’t understand why I need to give such. God and spirits are the examples.”

Okay, I am not trying to cause problems. I was fairly specific when I stated that I didn’t want you to use those example, not because I am denying God is immaterial but because those examples don’t help my comprehension because I share no concept with you of an immaterial God. You seem to have misunderstood what I said here.

Let me try this again in a different way: Are there any examples of non-physical substance other than God or Spirits? Can you please give me some if there are or just tell me that those are the two examples. This will help quite a bit. (I’m working on a theory of why your examples seem meaningless to me based on a difference in some assumptions that we do not share.)

“Aristotle’s definition does have meaning when applied to non-physical substances. Your failure to grasp its meaning when so applied does not prove there isn’t one.”

You are correct. It’s possible there is a meaning here I’m not grasping and thus the failure would be that I don’t yet have enough understanding of either the words or the assumptions he is hold. I don’t want you to feel defensive on this. All that being said, it was a valid thing to say in this discussion. It’s still valid. Aristotle’ used only physical examples. I grasp no meaning (even if the failure is my own due to lack of vocabulary) other than physical in his statement. What I mean to say is: I understand his statement as it applies to the physical world, but not as it applies to a non-physical world.

Predicate:

2. Logic. a. to affirm or assert (something) of the subject of a proposition.

That’s what you mean? It’s not what I expected.

Logic is something I actually do know something about.

Wikipedia states:
Sometimes it is inconvenient or impossible to describe a set by listing all of its elements. Another useful way to define a set is by specifying a property that the elements of the set have in common. The notation P(x) is used to denote a sentence or statement P concerning the variable object x. The set defined by P(x) written {x | P(x)}, is just a collection of all the objects for which P is sensible and true.

For instance, {x | x is a positive integer less than 4} is the set {1,2,3}.

In formal semantics a predicate is an expression of the semantic type of sets. An equivalent formulation is that they are thought of as indicator functions of sets, i.e. functions from an entity to a truth value.

In first-order logic, a predicate can take the role as either a property or a relation between entities.

For example, the sentences “The car Jane is driving is blue”, “The sky is blue”, and “The cover of this book is blue” come from the template “is blue” by placing an appropriate noun/noun phrase in front of it. The phrase “is blue” is a predicate and it describes the property of being blue. Predicates are often given a name. For example any of “is_blue”, “Blue” or “B” can be used to represent the predicate “is blue” among others. If we adopt B as the name for the predicate “is_blue”, sentences that assert an object is blue can be represented as “B(x)”, where x represents an arbitrary object. B(x) reads as “x is blue”.

Let’s compare this to your example of “hardness is predicated of a diamond, therefore a diamond is a substance, but hardness is not.”

Please use the above explanation (or point me to another one that fits better) with your example above.

I see that hardness is a characteristic of diamonds already.

By the way, is this link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory) an accurate description of what you mean by “substance”?

I have a question for you — theorectical only. What if “God” was made up of pure thought. (i.e., for the sake of argument take this as a given. I’m not asking you to believe it. It’s just a hypothetical). Would that mean that the substance of God was thought?

At this point, I think I have at least one assumption worked out that must be taken as a given to understand the Catholic point of view. “There is a substance (i.e. something distinct from it’s properties) that is God that cannot be broken down into any more parts. Thus it’s not made up of anything and while it has properties (like omnipotence or perfect love) those are properties of ths substance of God. This is a postulate for Trinitarians.”

Feel free to help me reword that.

“In my view you are simply mistaken. Aristotle’s definition does have meaning when applied to non-physical substances. Your failure to grasp its meaning when so applied does not prove there isn’t one.”

What I should have said is that it has no meaning to me outside of physical and he didn’t give any other examples to help me bridge the gap. I wasn’t trying to make an absolute statement of fact, but rather an absolute statement of fact about my current understanding and the realistic possibility I could have understood otherwise based on what’s been said so far.

That being said, we’re gonna spend a lot of time if you are going to require me every time to add a similar caveat. I hope you will see past my language and attempt to understand the underlying meaning.

Bruce:

You write, “I don’t want you to feel defensive on this.”

No worries there, my friend. : )

You write, “I was fairly specific when I stated that I didn’t want you to use those example, not because I am denying God is immaterial but because those examples don’t help my comprehension because I share no concept with you of an immaterial God.”

I don’t understand what you mean by saying we “share no concept” of an immaterial God. You understand the word “immaterial”, do you not? I know you understand the concept of a god. So all you have to do is put those two concepts together, and we will be sharing the concept.

I think you really mean that we share no *belief* in an immaterial God. Certainly that’s true. But not believing in something need not prevent us from being able to conceive of it, and to share an understanding of the concept. I don’t believe in unicorns but it takes me little effort to combine the concepts of “horse” and “horn” to form the concept “unicorn”, and to share that concept with another person.

You write, “Are there any examples of non-physical substance other than God or Spirits?”

No, none that I can think of.

You write, “Aristotle’ used only physical examples. I grasp no meaning (even if the failure is my own due to lack of vocabulary) other than physical in his statement. What I mean to say is: I understand his statement as it applies to the physical world, but not as it applies to a non-physical world.”

All I can say is, I don’t know why you don’t understand it as it applies to a non-physical being. I gave the example of omnipotence being predicable of God: God is a thing in which omnipotence inheres. Omnipotence does not exist on its own, it can only exist as a predicate of something: When a thing is omnipotent, then omnipotence exists; when no thing is omnipotent, then omnipotence does not exist. I assume you have no problem conceiving of a material being in whom omnipotence inheres. That material being would be the substance in which omnipotence inheres, or in other words the subject of which omnipotence is predicated. All you have to do is change “material” to “immaterial”, and you’ve got it.

I suggest bearing in mind the difference between conceiving and imagining. I have no doubt that it’s difficult for you to imagine an immaterial being; it’s only natural since our nature limits our imaginations such that they can only present images to our minds which are composed of fragments and combinations of physical perceptions. Our imaginations have no “material” with which to construct an image of an immaterial being, except by representing it as a glowing transparent sphere or an all-permeating mist, or some such; which, if immaterial beings really exist, must be inaccurate.

But there is no logical ground upon which to hold that imaginability is a prerequisite to conceivability or believability. To conceive of an immaterial being all you have to do is combine the concept of immateriality with the concept of being, and you’re there.

By the way if you would like to convert this discussion into a private one via e-mail I would be agreeable. I’m not sure how long we should continue to use this space to work out our differences of opinion. Feel free to e-mail me at agellius1 at gmail dot com. Or we can keep going here if you prefer.

“I don’t understand what you mean by saying we “share no concept” of an immaterial God.”

I mean I have no intuition of this, so I can’t relate to it. I still can’t. Putting the two concepts together — to be frank — seems like a contradiction to me. It’s like saying “a perfectly round square.” I know what a square is and I know what round is, but putting them together does nothing but create confusion.

BUT please note that none of this matters. I’m explaining my point of view, but it’s irrelvant to understanding the orthodox Trinity because, I can see, that this is a postulate. I will accept the postulate.

“All I can say is…”

This is no longer relevant now that I’ve taken the postulate that God is immaterial and that you do not define immaterial in an way I am familiar with. In fact, now that it’s a postulate I believe that means it doesn’t need to be defined at all.

“I suggest bearing in mind the difference between conceiving and imagining…”

EXCELLENT POINT! But no, it is not what I mean in this case when I speak of not understanding what an immaterial God is. I literally lack a definition for immaterial that fits anything you are saying about God. But your point is very very valid to the discussion in general.

“To conceive of an immaterial being all you have to do is combine the concept of immateriality with the concept of being, and you’re there”

As previously stated, I believe this is incorrect. I believe there is no way to conceive an immaterial God but by postulate unless you meant God is formless, which is not what I think you meant based on context.

Consider the two definitions in my handy dictionary:

1. Having no material body or form.
2. Of no importance or relevance.

Now I’m going to assume we didn’t mean #2.

But what does it mean to not have a material body or form?

Is gas immaterial? Yes, from a certain point of view. From another point of view even gas has form. If you told me God is immaterial in the same sense gas is immaterial, I’d understand what you meant. But is that what you meant?

Is energy immaterial? Yes, from a certain point of view. Of course we all know that energy and matter are really the same substance (E=MC2) but I think we can say energy has no form or body. Then again, is that really true? Does energy truly have no form at all in any sense of the word “form”? I guess I’m not so sure. But regardless, is this what you really meant? If you was, then I could understand what an immaterial God is. (I’d think of you as believing God is energy.)

Another way something might be immaterial would be if it’s conceptual only, like say math. Is this what you meant by immaterial? Are you saying God is just a concept?

Something could be immaterial by not existing. I doubt this is what you meant.

I’m not being difficult here, I literally can’t think of any way to conceive of God being immaterial except in some way like the above, none of which I believe either of us except as true about God. I can’t think of any definition of immaterial that fits with God without either saying something that I doubt you meant or being a contradiction.

Bruce:

Since we have transferred the discussion to e-mail I will send my response that way.

Here are some related discussions:

http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2006/10/are-mormons-trinitarian/
http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2005/10/thinking-about-the-trinity/
http://timesandseasons.org/index.php/2007/07/guest-post-the-apostles-creed-and-the-book-of-mormon/
http://blog.beliefnet.com/crunchycon/2007/05/mormons-christians-or-not.html
http://blog.beliefnet.com/crunchycon/2007/12/on-mormonism.html